Side channel attackers observe external manifestations of internal computations in an embedded system to predict the encryption key employed. The ability to examine such external manifestations (power dissipation or electromagnetic emissions), is a major threat to secure embedded systems. This paper proposes a secure multiprocessor architecture to prevent side channel attacks, based on a dual-core algorithmic balancing technique, where two identical cores are used. Both cores use a single clock and encrypt simultaneously, with one core executing the original encryption, while the second executes the complementary encryption. This effectively balances the crucial information from the power profile (note that it is the information and not the power profile itself), hiding the actual key from the adversary attempting an attack based on Differential Power Analysis (DPA).
significant variation in the dissipated power sequence. Executing a program with the complementary algorithm will produce complementary bit-flips, with the original algorithm (e.g., bit-flip 1 → 0 will correspond to bit-flip 0 → 1). Therefore, if we execute both the original and complementary encryptions simultaneously, the information on the power profile due to bit-flips of the secret key will cancel out.
Note that the power profile itself will be the addition of both cores. Specifically, it is the correlation between the critical information and the power profile that we mask. Thus it is not our intention to have a flat power profile, but a power profile which is absent of information containing the encryption key.
The plethora of embedded systems containing multiprocessors such as cell phones, PDAs, gaming consoles, audio players, video recorders and video cameras [14] [15] [16] motivated the use of one in-built core of a multi-core processor to function as a balancing unit, countering the real effects caused by the secret key in the power profile.
In this work, we have implemented the proposed balancing technique on a dual-core multiprocessor.
The two cores of the processor generally execute independent tasks (or threads), but when one core starts to execute the encryption algorithm, the second core automatically starts the complementary encryption program. Note that the second core is used for balancing only when there is an encryption algorithm running on the first core.
Part of this work was presented at ICCAD (2008) [?], where the balancing mechanism for AES was explained. This journal generalizes the balancing mechanism by enforcing it to DES and AES. The balancing control and switching mechanisms are presented in detail.

Motivation
Significant variation in the dissipated power sequence, due to the bit-flips occurring while processing encryption keys, enable power analysis attacks. Balancing these bit-flips would mask the correlation produced by the actual key. However, previous balancing techniques [17] [18] [19] [20] [21] [22] used complementary logic within the chip that performs balancing even when there is no encryption, making them area and power hungry. Real time embedded systems have to not only be secure, but must remain small, fast and costeffective. As such, it is imperative that components be used for actual processing as much as possible, and only used for obfuscation when absolutely necessary. Using an already available core for algorithmic balancing inside a multicore chip will prevent adding extra hardware components, which would have been necessary otherwise.
Paper Organization
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II summarizes previously proposed countermeasures. Our balancing methodology is explained in Sections III and the framework is presented in Section IV. Section V explains the experimental setup used for measurement and analysis. Results are presented in Section VI and a discussion is provided in Section VII. Finally, the paper is concluded in Section VIII.
II. RELATED WORK
In recent years, several countermeasures have been proposed to prevent side channel attacks. Effective countermeasures include masking, current/power flattening, non-deterministic processing, instruction injection and balancing.
Masking techniques [5, 11, 23] use random values during the actual computation to prevent the processed data being exploited by the adversary. For example, Trichina et al. [24] proposed a masking technique to protect AES, where random values are used for additional computation of the result after each round.
Muresan and Gebotys [25] proposed a current flattening technique, where the dissipated current is flattened by adding nops in the code to provide sufficient discharge. A signal suppression circuit in [26] is used to suppress the dissipated current.
Non-Deterministic Processors [27] execute the instructions out-of-order, issuing independent code segments randomly during runtime. The adversary cannot identify the places where specific instructions are executed by looking at the power profile, since the instruction execution is non-deterministic.
A number of researchers have stated that the insertion of dummy instructions (NOPs) could be a solution to protect systems from side channel attacks [2, 28] . Several dummy operation insertion techniques are proposed for ECC cryptosystems to create a constant execution path [29, 30] . Random instruction injection techniques are presented in Ambrose et al. [31, 32] Recently, several researchers [?, [17] [18] [19] [20] [21] [22] 33 ] have proposed logic/circuitry level balancing techniques to prevent side channel attacks, using complementary logic or modified secure logic to balance bit-flips.
Dual-Rail circuits [20] are designed to consume the same power regardless of data processed. In Dual-Rail circuits, each logic circuit is attached to complementary logic, complementing the discharge occurring in the original logic circuit due to bit-flips [19] . Sense Amplifier Based Logic (SABL) [18] , is a circuit which dissipates the same dynamic power regardless of the bit transition (1 → 0, 0 → 1, 1 → 1 or 0 → 0). Tiri and Verbauwhede [21, 22] proposed Wave Dynamic Differential Logic (WDDL), which uses parallel combination of two complementary gates to dissipate power independent of input. The second gate in WDDL uses the inverted inputs of the original, producing the inverted output of the original (first) gate, thus dissipating balanced power. Some improved versions of the mentioned circuitry techniques are proposed in [17, 33] .
In general, masking techniques have been vulnerable to second order DPA attacks [12, 34, 35] , which are algorithm specific approaches requiring higher degree of manual intervention. Non-Deterministic Processors [27] are infeasible in highly dependent software code, which cannot be executed out-of-order.
The Non-Deterministic Processor [27] has complex circuitry (though no overhead has been reported).
The current flattening technique [25] increases execution time by up to 75%, and flattens locally, based upon basic blocks. Dummy or Random instruction injections [29] [30] [31] [32] can be eliminated using time shifting [36] and by using a large number of samples. The circuitry level balancing solutions [17, 18, [20] [21] [22] 33] , considered the most appropriate solutions to prevent DPA, double the original chip size due to the complementary balancing logic circuits. These balancing logic circuits (which are permanently implemented inside the chip) are unnecessary when a non-cryptographic program is executing on the chip. In addition to the significant area overhead, WDDL techniques [21, 22] Our multiprocessor balancing technique also requires manual intervention and it is algorithm specific at this stage, similar to masking techniques [5, 11, 23] . However, our solution is comparatively easy to generalize by examining the algorithm and is not vulnerable to second-order DPA. Our multiprocessor balancing does not need a complete software modification compared to current flattening [25] and it does not cause significant runtime overhead. Compared to the hardware balancing methods [17] [18] [19] [20] [21] [22] 33] , ours does not require additional hardware, and utilizes one of the already available cores. A miniscule amount of additional hardware is associated for the synchronization. The second core is utilized only when an encryption/decryption part in a cryptographic program is executed by the first core, and otherwise the second core is left for regular processing of other tasks. Our approach does not need any libraries to be modified or compiled as has to be done in [33] . Hence, the multiprocessor balancing is an easily implementable system with reduced area overhead usage for switching and synchronizing when no balancing is required. 6 
A. Contributions
• An algorithmic level balancing architecture to conceal information is proposed for a dual-core multiprocessor • A synthesized hardware implementation is presented and the security is justified by exploiting the attack using power measurements
• The balancing is demonstrated on both DES and AES, which are well known block ciphers
B. Limitations and Assumptions
• Our technique addresses only multiprocessor embedded systems with at least two identical cores.
• We assume that our system is self contained with separate memories for each of the cores.
• Cache is disabled during balancing.
• Both cores are clocked by a single source.
III. ALGORITHMIC BALANCING
This section presents the balancing approaches proposed for DES and AES cryptographic algorithms.
A. Algorithmic Balancing in DES
Data Encryption Standard (DES [37] ) is one of the popular and an aged block cipher [?] . We use DES for balancing to demonstrate the proof of our concept. As depicted in Fig. 2(a) , the DES algorithm contains 16 rounds. In the first round, as per the algorithm the input is passed through an initial permutation and then split into two parts, L 0 and R 0 . XOR (denoted as ⊕) is applied to R 0 and the original sub key K 1 (which is 48 bits wide and is one of 16 subkeys). R 0 and K 1 are XORed and the output is used for SBOX look-up. An XOR operation is applied to the output from the SBOX and L 0 to produce the intermediate value a 1 . This value a 1 is placed in R 1 and R 0 is placed in L 1 . This completes the first round.
A similar procedure is continued for all rounds (16 rounds), as shown in Fig. 2(a) , and finally the output is generated using an inverted permutation. The point at which side channel power analysis occurs is the store operation of the intermediate result a i in DES. Though differing places for exploitation have been tried by previous researchers, they have, so far, only succeeded when attacking a i [11] .
The balancing effect in DES is accomplished by inverting both data and the key as shown in Fig. 2(b) .
Similar to the original DES algorithm in Fig. 2 (a) the inverted DES algorithm in Fig. 2(b) passes the inverted input through the initial permutation and then splits it into two parts, L 0 and R 0 . XOR is again applied to the fragment of inverted data present in R 0 and the inverted sub keyK 1 . This results in the same output as applying XOR to non-inverted data and non-inverted key as shown in Fig. 2(a) . The output, which is the XOR of R 0 andK 1 , is used for SBOX look-up, and the SBOX value produced will be the same as the one obtained with original data and original key. However, XOR is now applied to the output from the SBOX, and data L 0 , thus resulting in inverted outputā 1 being placed in R 1 . R 0 is passed to L 1 ; thus, L 1 is complementary of L 1 . The R i and L i in the original algorithm shown in Fig. 2 (a) are completely complementary to R i and L i of the inverted algorithm shown in Fig. 2(b) . This property of complementary execution will be preserved throughout all rounds of the DES algorithm. In this way a total complement of essential information is achieved between the core performing the encryption with the real key and data with the core acting on the inverted key and inverted data.
The attacking point (the place where DPA is performed) in DES is the store of a i . Therefore having the same index for the SBOX lookup in both programs will not cause any vulnerability, since complementary outputs are stored. The following analysis proves that algorithmic balancing will provide an effective countermeasure against power analysis side channel attack for DES. To do this we consider a power model based on Hamming distance [38] , as shown in Equation 1, where P is the power consumed, H is the Hamming weight function, k is the scalar gain and n is the noise term. H is given by |Y ⊕ X|, where X is the previous value in the register and Y is the new value after the operation.
As can be seen from Fig. 2 (a) and Fig. 2(b) , a 1 andā 1 are complementary, and as such the Hamming weight of a 1 andā 1 will be the number of bits in a 1 . Likewise, a 2 , a 3 etc will be balanced by their corresponding complemented values as shown in Fig. 2(b) . Since the Hamming weights for a i ⊕ā i is always 48, the attack point is no longer vulnerable, since k and n are uncorrelated from the sensitive transitions, and now H is constant, thus making P a constant value. Similar to Brier et al. [38] , we assume that the initial value X = 0 (such an assumption is valid for any pre-charged logic [22] ).
B. Algorithmic Balancing in AES
Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) is a symmetric-key block cipher encryption algorithm [10] and is used in a wide range of embedded applications [1] . In our experiments we use the 128-bit AES (AES with 192 bits and 256 bits are also currently used). Fig. 3 depicts the AES algorithm, specifying only the necessary parts to analyze the attack. A detailed explanation of AES can be found in [39, 40] . The 128-bit AES is considered for our experiments; others (192-bit and 256-bit) can be also treated in a similar way.
As shown in Fig. 3 the 128 bits input data (which is shown as separate 8 bits blocks -thus input is divided into blocks numbered from 0 to 15) is xor'ed with the 128 bits round key (this initial round key is the actual secret key, and the remaining round keys are generated using a key scheduling algorithm Since the Hamming weight for x ⊕ x is always 8, the attack point is no longer vulnerable; k and n are constants, and since H is constant, P is a constant value. If the attack also considers the power consumption caused by the bitflips in the bus during load and store, the power model is added with an additional component rH b as explained in [28] . The modified power model is presented in Equation 2, where r is the scalar gain and H b is the Hamming weight in the bus during load or store.
Since the complete balancing uses complementary index and retrieving complementary outputs from the SBOX (as shown in Fig. 4 ), the resulting Hamming weight H b is also constant. Hence, the power consumption P is still maintained at a constant value.
IV. MULTIPROCESSOR BALANCING ARCHITECTURES
The multiprocessor balancing architectures for both DES and AES are presented in this section.
A. Base Architecture
Fig . 5 depicts the schematic diagram of the base dual core processor used in our design. As depicted, the processor has two identical cores with separate instruction and data memories for each core.
B. Balancing Control
In our implementation we use a flag register to indicate the encryption program execution and to start the balancing. This flag register can be set in one of three ways: (i), using the operating system when scheduling the encryption program to the core; (ii), detecting the memory location accesses where the data and key for the encryption are stored; or (iii), using a special instruction to set the flag register.
Termination of balancing, by clearing the flag register, can be performed in a similar fashion by using the operating system which can clear the flag register when the scheduled encryption program is completed;
or by inserting a special instruction in the source code to clear the flag.
For our experiments, balancing is triggered and terminated by two special instructions which are instrumented in the source code (i.e., the first, startBal, and the last, stopBal, instructions of the encryption program A as shown in Fig. 6 ).
The execution of the startBal instruction indicates to the CONTROLLER that an encryption program is scheduled in the core. An External Interrupt is raised in CORE2. This is a maskable interrupt which will will be executed by CORE1, which will send a signal to the CONTROLLER indicating the completion of encryption. The CONTROLLER restores the saved registers from the stack. CORE2 will resume its execution and the next available program will be scheduled on CORE1.
C. Switching and Interrupts
An External Interrupt is supplied by the CONTROLLER to one of the cores to service an interrupt while the balancing is in progress. This interrupt is serviced after the pipelines are flushed, thus the registers are updated with the correct values. Each interrupt routine (e.g., program B) will have three code segments:
one, backupReg, to save the registers into the stack; two, restoreReg, to restore the registers from the stack; and three, endIntr, to end the interrupt. The endIntr instruction sends a Non-maskable Interrupt (NMI) to the CONTROLLER as shown in Fig. 6 . An NMI request will force the controller to change the PC of both cores to their original locations to resume balancing. This is done at the same clock cycle inorder to preserve synchronization. When a CORE receives an interrupt during balancing, the other CORE is put on hold till the interrupt is serviced. However, the other CORE can be also allowed to execute the next program in the queue, but with careful modification in the controller to maintain synchronization for balancing. The interrupts from one core to another can be also handled by operating systems using software interrupts [41, 42] . 
D. The Multiprocessor Balancing Frameworks
V. EXPERIMENTAL SETUP
The hardware design that was used for the multiprocessor balancing architectures (MUTE-DES and Fig. 8 . The Instruction Set Architecture (ISA) is fed into an automatic processor design tool called (ASIPMeister [43] ) and two identical cores (CORE1 and CORE2) are generated to create both MUTE-DES and MUTE-AES separately.
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VI. RESULTS
This section illustrates the results for MUTE-DES and MUTE-AES multiprocessor balancing frame-
works, separately. Each architecture is presented with its DPA, hardware summary and performance analysis.
A. Results for MUTE-DES 1) DPA in MUTE-DES:
We performed DPA experiments (based on [2] and [11] ) on the normal dualcore architecture and MUTE-DES processor, by executing the DES cryptographic program and analyzing each SBOX lookup in each round. Two commonly used selection functions are either based on SBOX output bits, or based on the selection bits to the SBOX. Since the DPA, based on the SBOX output bit [11] did not reveal the key in our experiments, we present results of DPA based on selection bits to the SBOX [2] . This DPA follows the method proposed by Messerges et al. [5] , which predicts the secret key by inspecting all possible SBOX lookups in each round.
The X axis of the displayed DPA plots give all possible key values from 0 to 255 (the first eight bits of a DES encryption key), which is plotted against the DPA values (Watts) in the Y axis for each key guess. The attacking point is the store instruction just after the SBOX lookup, where the SBOX output is XORed with the inverted data and stored (as explained in Section III). Fig. 10 shows a DPA trace performed on a normal dual-core processor, where one core is executing the DES program while the other remains idle.
Predicting the correct key corresponds to the significant peak in the DPA trace. In this example (shown in Fig. 10 ) the significant peak happens at a key value of 10; DPA was performed on the third selection bit, for the third sbox lookup, in the last round of encryption. Note that another significant peak also appears for the key 233, which is slightly lower than the peak at 10. Reasons for such ghost peaks are given in [7] .
Concealment of information in our proposed architecture can be achieved when both data and key are inverted. Fig. 11 is produced when the balancing core uses the inverted secret key and the inverted data of the first core (DPA on the third selection bit, for the third sbox lookup, in the last round of encryption).
As shown in Fig. 11 , DPA cannot reveal the secret key in the MUTE-DES architecture, where the correct key (value of 10) does not produce a significant peak. The DPA values are much less for MUTE-DES as shown in Fig. 11 , compared to the single core DPA values shown in Fig. 10 . This is due to the balancing of the information in processing '1's and '0's.
To demonstrate the security of our method we compare executions of the encryption algorithm with two different inputs (these were randomly chosen) and subtract the two "clock cycle accurate" power traces. The only information available to the attacker comes from the differences between the power traces for different data inputs chosen. Thus, for an attacker to be able to extract any usable information about the key from the power traces, the power traces for different inputs must be distinguishable.
We used Fast Fourier Transform (FFT) analysis to examine the spectrum available. Our experiments show that the difference when balancing is used (shown in Fig. 12(b) ), is an order of magnitude lower than the difference when the program is running on a single core (shown in Fig. 12(a) ), and that the frequency spectrum of the difference has far less information (shown in Fig. 12(d) ), unlike the spectrum of the difference for a single core (shown in Fig. 12(c) ) which exhibits many well defined peaks.
Similarly, using the same input data but with two different keys, two clock cycle accurate power traces are obtained. One power trace is subtracted from the other and the obtained result is much smaller for the MUTE-DES architecture when compared to the result from the single core. Once again we see a much lower amount of variation in the FFT output. For an attacker to extract any usable information from the power trace about the key, the power trace and the key value must have a non negligible correlation. The difference of power traces for different keys must be above the noise threshold for a successful attack.
Thus, the magnitude of the difference and its spectrum indicate that little information above noise level is present in the power trace, regardless of what data or key is used.
To get a better appreciation for the hiding ability of our method, we also ran an experiment which was not perfectly balanced, by complementing only the key, and not the data. The DPA graph is presented on Fig. 13(a) , and it clearly shows that the peak that corresponds to the right guess is much lower on
MUTE-DES.
However, when we find the differences of the power traces for two different keys as shown in Fig. 13(b)[1] , and examine its spectrum (shown in Fig. 13(b)[2] ), we still see several well defined peaks, leaving the possibility that there might be some usable information. This shows that both the key and the data must be inverted to preclude the presence of any attacker usable information in the power trace. From the variations shown in Fig. 14(a) , the DPA when DES is scheduled on one core, produces higher values when compared to MUTE-DES. MUTE-DES displays a flattened variation (values close to zero) shown in Fig. 14(b) . This flattening is due to the balanced bit-flips.
Note that the DPA based on the SBOX output bit [11] showed similar variations, where the DPA values are flattened after balancing. As shown in Table III , every time balancing is performed, there is a delay of 728 clock cycles, which includes saving and restoring necessary registers, setting and clearing the flag for switching, and memory accesses. This delay comprises of only 0.94% percent of the runtime. Note that this overhead does not include any delay in software interrupts, which might occur while the system is encrypting. While the balancing is being performed, the second core will not be doing its usual tasks. Hence, the whole system will have a further delay of 76,350 cycles in the worst case scenario.
2) Hardware Summary for MUTE-DES:
B. Results for MUTE-AES 1) Differential Power Analysis (DPA):
We performed the Differential Power Analysis (DPA) on AES to predict the correct 8 bits of the secret key based on the definitions from [2, 11] , where the first output bit from the forth SBOX in first round is used for partitioning. The attack point for power measurement is the load instruction from the SBOX. All the DPA plots here are drawn for the DPA bias values (Y axis in watts) versus the possible 256 key values (i.e., 0 to 255 for 8 bits). A standard dual-core processor, executing AES on one core and keeping the other core idle (without any countermeasure), is attacked to determine the scenario of the attack and also as a base case. Fig. 15 depicts the DPA plots for a single core (in a dual-core processor), where the top plot is attacked at the load (LW) instruction, the bottom left at the XOR instruction and the bottom right plot using the average of the power consumption during the SBOX access (i.e., average of the power magnitudes starting from load till the store after the SBOX lookup). In all three cases shown in Fig. 15 the correct key (value of 14) is clearly identified by a significant peak, thus successfully passing the attack hypothesis.
To justify the necessity of the complete inversion algorithm for the countermeasure, the partial inversion explained in Section III-B is attacked using DPA. As Fig. 16 depicts, the correct key is still predicted using the load (LW) instruction and the XOR instruction, both of which reveal a significant peak. This experiment shows that the balancing effect caused by operations other than the SBOX accesses cannot mask the key. Hence, the SBOX accesses play an important role in revealing the key, and has to be balanced completely. Fig. 17 presents the DPA plots for the completely balanced processor architecture which is explained in Section III-B. As the plots reveal, the DPA signals at the correct key guess (value 14) failed to produce significant peaks for all the three cases (i.e., load instruction, XOR instruction and average during SBOX access). The DPA bias values are much smaller and have a smaller variation when compared to the values observed for the single core, especially at the load (LW) instruction (which is the main attack point exploited by previous researchers [11] ).
Comparisons similar to that of DES (explained in Section VI-A.1) are performed to demonstrate the security of our method in MUTE-AES by subtracting two "clock cycle accurate" power traces for two different inputs. We used Fast Fourier Transform (FFT) analysis to examine the spectrum available. Our experiments show that the difference when balancing is used (shown in Fig. 18(c) ), is much lower with more zeroes than the difference for an AES execution scheduled on one core of the processor (shown in Fig. 18(a) ), and that the frequency spectrum of the difference looks much like white noise (shown in Fig. 18(d) ), unlike the spectrum of the difference for the original AES (shown in Fig. 18(b) ) that exhibits many well defined peaks.
The magnitude of the difference and its spectrum indicate that no information above noise level is present in the power trace, regardless of what the used data or key. This also proves that our balancing technique (MUTE-AES) prevents the system from Simple Power Analysis (SPA). Since MUTE-AES balances the intermediate data throughout the AES algorithm (i.e., Hamming weight of the processed data is always balanced) there won't be any correlation between Hamming weight and power magnitude. Table II , since the same flag registers and cores are used. Note that the only difference is the memory setup between MUTE-DES and MUTE-AES as shown in Fig. 7 .
2) Hardware Summary for MUTE-AES: MUTE-AES also has the same hardware details of MUTE-DES as shown in
3) Performance Overhead in MUTE-AES:
The performance overhead caused, when the second core is switched for balancing, is tabulated in Table IV As shown in Table IV , every time balancing is performed, there is a delay of 728 clock cycles, which includes saving and restoring necessary registers, setting and clearing the flag for switching and memory accesses. This delay costs 0.42% percentage in additional runtime. This overhead does not include any delay in software interrupts which might occur while the system is encrypting. A further latency of 175,600 clock cycles will be added to the whole processing time in the worst case. This is because that the second core has to pause its normal processing when balancing.
VII. DISCUSSION
In our approach, the primary core executes the cryptographic program (the second one runs the complementary version), which is enhanced with additional flag registers. But in practice, the operating system can decide upon the task scheduling of processors. The operating system can force an application to run on a particular core [44] , thus always scheduling the cryptographic program to the primary core.
If we allow the OS to schedule the cryptographic program to either core, then additional flag registers have to be attached to all the cores, to enable such a universal execution.
Similar algorithmic level balancing can be performed using a VLIW processor, where a normal instruction and a complementary instruction can be included in a word [45] . But in such cases a VLIW processor will not be able to execute any other program when encryption is not being performed.
Since balancing is performed by a specific core all the time, a powerful magnetic probe can be placed on top of the chip to observe the electromagnetic (EM) dissipation of only one of the cores, which is executing the correct program. There is a high probability that the correct key can be exposed from these measurements. To prevent this scenario, the place and route of both cores can be performed together with both cores overlaid on top of each other, without a clear partition between the two.
Such on overlaid place and route also prevents one of the cores having a greater power footprint (due to physical variations in the wafer) than the other. If one of the cores did have a greater power footprint, then the encryption key can be extracted by side-channel analysis. However, with an overlaid place and route, individual bits in registers can exhibit greater power profile, but such things will be random amongst the two cores and will not remove the balancing ability of the MUTE architecture.
Another consideration is if one core encrypts while the other performs normal computation, then there might be sufficient hiding from the noise of the second core. Hiding the actual behavior in the power profile by the second core is difficult. Millions of samples taken will statistically average out the noise, which once subtracted will then reveal the encryption key. Hence, MUTE guarantees hiding all of the time and does not allow any leakage of secure information to an adversary.
We assume that the instructions are stored in an non-writable (i.e., only readable) ROM. Hence, an attacker can not modify the sensitive contol registers and the signals. However, we should point out that physical attack on the memory is still possible but several solutions exist to prevent physical attacks (which is not our scope). Storing such critical information into a ROM costs in hardware area. All the cryptographic techniques have this memory overhead (or a dedicated ROM to store the key and the code) and hence we did not consider it as an extra overhead.
In this work, we managed to attack the secret key only at the SBOX output in AES and at the SBOX input in DES. None of the other places in DES or AES produced a significant peak in the DPA signal.
Hence, we demonstrated the balancing technique, considering only these attacking places. However, it is worth to note that the balancing algorithm would be different if the attack place is different. Our aim is to prove that the algorithmic multiprocessor balancing can be used to prevent power analysis attacks and its up to the designer to deploy this technique based on the attacking point observed.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
This paper proposes a Multiprocessor Balancing Technique to prevent side channel attacks for the most common block ciphers, DES and AES. The second core in a dual-core processor is used to mask the effects caused by the secret key from the first core, by running the complementary program in parallel 20 to the first core.
The balancing is only performed when necessary. The same methodology can be applied with minimal changes to any encryption programs which operate in a "bit-wise" manner, by either permuting or flipping bits independently. Similar methods can also be developed to non-bit-wise methods such as RSA, but are harder to implement and, while significantly safer than non-balanced single processor methods, do not result in perfect balancing. Our future work will investigate on such balancing approaches. 
